China + Italy



Giant Sucking Sound of Chinese Theft

CrowdStrike, the infamous cybersecurity firm embedded in federal agencies, published a surprisingly damning report in October 2019 that exposed a Chinese cyberattack against the U.S. from 2010 to 2015. The report has since been removed from Crowdstrike's website, and a co-founder of the firm left shortly after its release.² In short, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) swiped enough intellectual property to create their own version of Boeing's 737, the crown jewel of America's commercial aviation industry. The report explained—in penetrating detail—the various hacking methods used, including USB data grabs.3 After decades of state-sponsored espionage, the Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE) COMAC unveiled the C919 in November 2015. All roads lead to Beijing.4





⁴ https://web.archive.org/web/20210501083149/https://www.governo.it/sites/governo.it/files/Memorandum Italia-Cina EN.pdf




https://web.archive.org/web/20210709024426/https://www.crowdstrike.com/resources/reports/

² https://web.archive.org/web/20210115152748/https://www.crn.com/news/security/crowdstrike-co-founder-dmitri-alperovitch-leaves-to-launch-nonprofit

³ https://web.archive.org/web/20210706144527/https://www.zdnet.com/article/building-chinas-comac-c919-airplane-involved-a-lot-of-hacking-report-says/

Pomigliano d'Arco

Pomigliano d'Arco (near Naples) is home to Leonardo SpA's premiere aircraft hub, where they've designed, built, and tested parts destined for Boeing aircraft for over a decade.⁵ Leonardo boasts that specialized craftsmanship of important parts for the 787 are manufactured here.⁶ Coincidentally, Leonardo has also invested millions on engineering activities for the development of a Chinese-Russian joint venture at Pomigliano.⁷ The sprawling campus at the base of Mt. Vesuvius is a crown jewel in Italy's military-industrial complex. Politicians from each of the umpteenth parties in Italy make the trek to Pomigliano for tours and staged photos.⁸



 $Figure \ 3-\underline{https://web.archive.org/web/20210706151157/https://www.flickr.com/photos/leonardocompany/33271689418}$

⁸ https://web.archive.org/web/20210706152919/https://www.flickr.com/photos/leonardocompany/46423521444/



⁵ https://web.archive.org/web/20210706151653/https://www.leonardocompany.com/documents/20142/104547/Boeing 787 programme milestones.pdf?t=1538988233364

⁶ https://web.archive.org/web/20210710200955/https://www.leonardocompany.com/en/news-and-stories-detail/-/detail/boeing-and-alenia-aermacchi-restructured-contract-787-program

⁷ https://web.archive.org/web/20210120063542/https://www.aeropolis.it/leonardo-luci-e-ombre-dal-palco-di-pomiqliano-darco/

CrowdStrike

On July 29th, 2020, Leonardo announced a collaboration with CrowdStrike to "strengthen the organizations' security posture."9




Figure 4 - https://web.archive.org/web/20210103000741/https://www.leonardocompany.com/en/press-release-detail/-/detail/29-09-2020-leonardo-and-crowdstrike-collaborate-to-strengthen-organizations-security-posture

Russian, Chinese, and U.S. aircraft are all co-located at the Pomigliano d'Arco facility, almost certainly a breach of U.S. export control laws. To make matters worse, another cyberattack—reminiscent of China's earlier hack—at the *same* facility was announced on December 5th, 2020. Despite Crowdstrike's extensive experience with Chinese aerospace hackers, they apparently failed to uncover the latest attack spanning from 2015 to 2017 that, once again, involved USB data grabs. To add culpability to injury, Leonardo was alerted in 2017 to *an abnormal outflow of data* by built-in cybersecurity safeguards. Said differently, the cyberattack that began in 2015 wasn't acted upon until 2020, even after Leonardo was *internally* alerted to it. According to the official story, two of the world's most premier cybersecurity institutions failed to stop highly sensitive data from being stolen even though they had already been tipped off. Leonardo and CrowdStrike were either utterly incompetent or complicit.

¹³ https://web.archive.org/web/20210108031200/https://brainwavescience.com/stories/december-23-2020-leonardo-hack-targeted-military-plane-details-arrest-warrant-icognative/



⁹ https://web.archive.org/web/20210103000741/https:/www.leonardocompany.com/en/press-release-detail/-/detail/29-09-2020-leonardo-and-crowdstrike-collaborate-to-strengthen-organizations-security-posture

¹⁰ https://web.archive.org/web/20210628211932/https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/12/23/2020-28052/addition-of-military-end-user-meu-list-to-the-export-administration-regulations-and-addition-of

¹¹ https://web.archive.org/web/20210414165404/https://www.commissariatodips.it/notizie/articolo/attacco-hacker-a-leonardo-spa-due-arresti/index.html

¹² Ibid.

Cyberattacks and Mont Blanc Pens

In an independent report about the attack, cyber investigators (*not* Crowdstrike) were shocked at how easy it was to uncover the scheme: Sending data in clear with a simple GET is a major oversight for an actor that, supposedly, wants to remain undetected.¹⁴

Conclusions

As we have just shown, the malware is not particularly sophisticated but it certainly reached its goal. Sending data in clear with a simple *GET* is a major oversight for an actor that, supposedly, wants to remain undetected. The frequent beaconing and the absence of all kinds of hiding/evasion mechanisms (with the exception of a basic sandbox evasion technique) shows either a lack of care, or a lack of structure. One factor that contributed to the success of the attack was that the installation was performed manually, thus not requiring sophisticated evasion techniques. At the same time, the level of security expected from a major defence contractor should have pushed a sophisticated attacker toward a very different *modus operandi*.

In our view the attack has been built opportunistically over time, with incremental enhancements, lacking the structure of a real APT and certainly the sophistication. Unless the attacker could leverage on his position within the company, to make sure he couldn't be detected, we can't see any reason why he was expected to otherwise remain hidden. In this regard, the code changes only show an increase in exfiltration capabilities, while completely neglecting the detection aspect.

 $Figure\ 5-https://web.archive.org/web/20210630190332/https://reaqta.com/2021/01/fujinama-analysis-leonardo-spa/2021/01/fujinama-analy$



Figure 6 – https://www.elite-network.com/partners/what-is-elite-partnership

Only one month after this announcement, a *separate* probe was launched into 10 Leonardo employees and a supplier (Trans-Part Srl) for bribery, black funds, fictitious contracts, fake salaries, and more. The total amount that is under investigation exceeds 6 million euros, which was laundered through Google Payments.¹⁵

Trans-Part was added to Leonardo's *Elite Partnership Program* in 2019 but has supplied them for nearly two decades. The program was ostensibly designed to provide suppliers with greater access to big banks that Leonardo is privileged to use. Two of Trans-Part's top managers were placed under investigation for fictitious contracts, payouts, and money laundering. The laundered money was sent back to Leonardo in exchange for fabricated contracts. The suckling of money from the teat of big banks bought everything from Mont Blanc pens to digital devices for the embezzlers.¹⁶

¹⁶ https://web.archive.org/web/20210127195652/https://www.laverita.info/fondi-neri-e-tangenti-indagati-google-e-manager-di-leonardo-2649919069.html



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
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
¹⁴ https://web.archive.org/web/20210630190332/https://reaqta.com/2021/01/fujinama-analysis-leonardo-spa/

¹⁵ https://web.archive.org/web/20210116191011/https://www.corrierecomunicazioni.it/digital-economy/leonardo-10-indagati-per-tangenti-sotto-inchiesta-due-societa-google/

Trans-Part Srl

Most of Trans-Part's clients are either a subsidiary of, in a joint venture with, or owned by Leonardo.¹⁷ Through the *Elite Partnership Program*, Trans-Part was able to receive loans from banks with *impeccable*¹⁸ integrity such as HSBC, UniCredit, and UBS.¹⁹





corporate-partnership-for-the-sustainable-growth-of-leonardo-s-hight-potential-suppliers

Figure 8 - https://web.archive.org/web/20201027170658/http://www.transpart.it/en/clients.html

¹⁹ https://web.archive.org/web/20200813092726/https://www.leonardocompany.com/en/press-release-detail/-/detail/06-05-2020-leonardo-signed-2-0-billion-new-credit-facilities-to-strengthen-the-group-s-liquidity-and-support-financial-flexibility



¹⁷ https://web.archive.org/web/20201027170658/http://www.transpart.it/en/clients.html

¹⁸ https://web.archive.org/web/20210620122336/https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/hsbc-holdings-plc-and-hsbc-bank-usa-na-admit-anti-money-laundering-and-sanctions-violations

Financial Backers

To help deliver this liquidity, Leonardo conveniently received €2.0 billion in May 2020 from UniCredit and HSBC, among others.²⁰ Additionally, in the past year, UBS Securities LLC and/or its affiliates received *compensation for ... services other than investment banking services*²¹ from Leonardo. What could those services have been? One should note that UBS Securities LLC infused \$400 million into Staple Street Capital III, LP (owner of Dominion Voting Systems) just three weeks before the 2020 presidential election.²² One should *also* note that in 2019 HSBC signed a Security Agreement with Dominion, receiving Dominion's patents as collateral.²³



Date	Stock Price (p)	Price Target (p)	Rating	
2018-03-23	9.40	10.50	Neutral	
2018-12-06	8.28	9.60	Neutral	
019-03-27	10.11	11.00	Neutral	
019-12-09	10.38	12.30	Buy	
020-04-23	6.24	8.00	Buy	
021-03-12	7.43	9.00	Buy	
sclosures				
	onths, UBS AG, its affiliates or subsidiaries ha		ensold! AG. ng services from this company/entity or one of its affiliates, services other than investment banking services from this com-	panylan

 $Figure \ 10 - \underline{https://web.archive.org/web/20210706190214/https://research.ibb.ubs.com/openaccess/compliance/103051 \ 1 \ new.html. \\$



 $Figure~11-\underline{https://web.archive.org/web/20210706142612/https://www.fromtheskies.it/arriva-il-comac-c919-aereo-di-linea-made-in-china/https://www.fromtheskies.it/arriva-il-comac-c919-aereo-di-linea-made-in-china/https://www.fromtheskies.it/arriva-il-comac-c919-aereo-di-linea-made-in-china/https://www.fromtheskies.it/arriva-il-comac-c919-aereo-di-linea-made-in-china/https://www.fromtheskies.it/arriva-il-comac-c919-aereo-di-linea-made-in-china/https://www.fromtheskies.it/arriva-il-comac-c919-aereo-di-linea-made-in-china/https://www.fromtheskies.it/arriva-il-comac-c919-aereo-di-linea-made-in-china/https://www.fromtheskies.it/arriva-il-comac-c919-aereo-di-linea-made-in-china/https://www.fromtheskies.it/arriva-il-comac-c919-aereo-di-linea-made-in-china/https://www.fromtheskies.it/arriva-il-comac-c919-aereo-di-linea-made-in-china/https://www.fromtheskies.it/arriva-il-comac-c919-aereo-di-linea-made-in-china/https://www.fromtheskies.it/arriva-il-comac-c919-aereo-di-linea-made-in-china/https://www.fromtheskies.it/arriva-il-comac-c919-aereo-di-linea-made-in-china/https://www.fromtheskies.it/arriva-il-comac-c919-aereo-di-linea-made-in-china/https://www.fromtheskies.it/arriva-il-comac-c919-aereo-di-linea-made-in-china/https://www.fromtheskies.it/arriva-il-comac-c919-aereo-di-linea-made-in-china/https://www.fromtheskies.it/arriva-il-comac-c919-aereo-di-linea-made-in-china/https://www.fromtheskies.it/arriva-il-comac-c919-aereo-di-linea-made-in-china/https://www.fromtheskies.it/arriva-il-comac-c919-aereo-di-linea-made-in-china/https://www.fromtheskies.it/arriva-il-comac-c919-aereo-di-linea-made-in-china/https://www.fromtheskies.it/arriva-il-comac-c919-aereo-di-linea-made-in-china/https://www.fromtheskies.it/arriva-il-comac-c919-aereo-di-linea-made-in-china/https://www.fromtheskies.it/arriva-il-comac-c919-aereo-di-linea-made-in-china/https://www.fromtheskies.it/arriva-il-comac-c919-aereo-di-linea-made-in-china/https://www.fromtheskies.it/arriva-il-comac-c919-aereo-di-linea-made-in-china/https://www.fromtheskies.it/arriva-il-c$

 $Figure 9 - \underline{https://web.archive.org/web/20200813092726/https://www.leonardocompany.com/en/press-release-detail/-/detail/06-05-2020-leonardo-signed-2-0-billion-new-credit-facilities-to-strengthen-the-group-s-liquidity-and-support-financial-flexibility$

²³ https://web.archive.org/web/20210515061817/https://legacv-assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/assignment-pat-50500-236.pdf



²⁰ https://web.archive.org/web/20200813092726/https://www.leonardocompany.com/en/press-release-detail/-/detail/06-05-2020-leonardo-signed-2-0-billion-new-credit-facilities-to-strengthen-the-group-s-liquidity-and-support-financial-flexibility

²¹ https://web.archive.org/web/20210706190214/https://research.ibb.ubs.com/openaccess/compliance/103051_1_new.html

²² https://web.archive.org/web/20210515061820/https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1827586/000182758620000001/xslFormDX01/primary_doc.xml

Noteworthy Banks

Leonardo also received at least €4,000,000,000 through a Mid-Term Note (MTN) program in May 2020.²⁴ The list of banks—once again!—included HSBC, UniCredit, and UBS. Leonardo's current CEO, Alessandro PROFUMO, formerly served as CEO of UniCredit; during his tenure at UniCredit he committed (and was subsequently convicted of) accounting fraud, among other crimes.²⁵ According to financial authorities, MTNs are especially susceptible to fraud.²⁶ A portion of the MTN program funds outlined in the prospectus were to be invested into Leonardo's facility in Pomigliano d'Arco, according to the filing.²⁷




Figure 12 - https://web.archive.org/web/20210706190753/https://www.leonardocompany.com/documents/20142/0/Leonardo+++2020+Update++++Base+Prospectus+%281%29.pdf

²⁷ https://web.archive.org/web/20210706190753/https://www.leonardocompany.com/documents/20142/0/Leonardo+-+2020+Update+-++Base+Prospectus+%281%29.pdf



²⁴ https://web.archive.org/web/20210706190753/https://www.leonardocompany.com/documents/20142/0/Leonardo+-+2020+Update+-++Base+Prospectus+%281%29.pdf

²⁵ https://web.archive.org/web/20210706191040/http://web.archive.org/screenshot/https://www.defensenews.com/industry/2020/10/15/leonardo-ceo-found-quilty-of-fraud-in-previous-job/

²⁶ https://web.archive.org/web/20210422004002/https://oig.treasury.gov/Scams/Prime-Bank-Investment-Fraud

Italian Nesting Dolls


Prior to these banking agreements, union workers at other Leonardo factories had begun demanding answers from Italian politicians:

Why do you only fund Leonardo at Pomigliano d'Arco?28

If everything had been functioning according to law, the transactional flow of money and goods would have looked like this:



However, with fraud, bribery, black funds²⁹, payoffs, and fictitious contracts³⁰ it actually looked like this:



²⁸ https://web.archive.org/web/20210706191551/https://www.prpchannel.com/en/leonardo-grottaglie/

³⁰ https://web.archive.org/web/20210224185330/https://www.policymakermag.it/italia/cosa-sappiamo-sulle-tangenti-a-uomini-leonardo/



²⁹ https://web.archive.org/web/20210118212150/https://www.ilfattoguotidiano.it/in-edicola/articoli/2021/01/14/leonardo-trovato-il-libro-mastro-delle-tangenti/6065076/

Great Expectations

HSBC, UniCredit, and UBS gave Leonardo loans. Leonardo then used the money to buy goods from Trans-Part, a supplier. It'd be one thing if *only* Leonardo were illegally pocketing funds (something Leonardo CEOs are *known*^{3†} for), but that was not the case. Two Trans-Part executives also pocketed money, suggesting a more sophisticated criminal conspiracy.³² Any losses Leonardo accumulated over time by paying off Pomigliano d'Arco employees *and* their suppliers could be strategically offset by the Italian government, which owns more than 30% of the company.³³

Italy was positioning itself for future contracts with China by leaking U.S. aerospace intellectual property. China's commercial aviation titans seek to supplant a world traditionally dominated by orders from U.S. manufacturers. In 2019, Boeing valued China's aircraft purchases at almost \$3 trillion over the next two decades³⁴. Nevertheless, COMAC *still* has no planes in operation, even after the theft which enabled the creation of the C919.³⁵ That delay, at least, is not only due to Italian corruption, but also Chinese ineptitude.



Figure 13 - https://web.archive.org/web/20200105201451/http://www.boeing.co.uk/news-media-room/news-releases/2015/june/boeing-torecasts-demand-for-38050-new-airplanes-valued-at-%245.6-trillion.page

 $Figure~14-\underline{https://web.archive.org/web/20210706142612/https://www.fromtheskies.it/arriva-il-comac-c919-aereo-di-linea-made-in-china/https://www.fromtheskies.it/arriva-il-comac-c919-aereo-di-linea-made-in-china/https://www.fromtheskies.it/arriva-il-comac-c919-aereo-di-linea-made-in-china/https://www.fromtheskies.it/arriva-il-comac-c919-aereo-di-linea-made-in-china/https://www.fromtheskies.it/arriva-il-comac-c919-aereo-di-linea-made-in-china/https://www.fromtheskies.it/arriva-il-comac-c919-aereo-di-linea-made-in-china/https://www.fromtheskies.it/arriva-il-comac-c919-aereo-di-linea-made-in-china/https://www.fromtheskies.it/arriva-il-comac-c919-aereo-di-linea-made-in-china/https://www.fromtheskies.it/arriva-il-comac-c919-aereo-di-linea-made-in-china/https://www.fromtheskies.it/arriva-il-comac-c919-aereo-di-linea-made-in-china/https://www.fromtheskies.it/arriva-il-comac-c919-aereo-di-linea-made-in-china/https://www.fromtheskies.it/arriva-il-comac-c919-aereo-di-linea-made-in-china/https://www.fromtheskies.it/arriva-il-comac-c919-aereo-di-linea-made-in-china/https://www.fromtheskies.html.$

³⁵ https://web.archive.org/web/20210706142612/https://www.fromtheskies.it/arriva-il-comac-c919-aereo-di-linea-made-in-china/



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³¹ https://web.archive.org/web/20210709030302if /https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-italy-leonardo-montedeipaschi/italys-5-star-movement-says-leonardo-ceo-should-resign-after-monte-deipaschi-ruling-idUKKBN2752JG


²⁰ https://web.archive.org/web/20210424075729/https://www.corrierecomunicazioni.it/digital-economy/leonardo-10-indagati-per-tangenti-sotto-inchiesta-due-societa-google/

³³ https://web.archive.org/web/20210629064901/https://www.leonardocompany.com/en/investors/stock-info/shareholders-base

³⁴ https://web.archive.org/web/20201101144933/https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/17/boeing-says-china-needs-to-spend-almost-3-trillion-on-new-planes.html


Follow the Money

UBS, HSBC, Leonardo, and COMAC are all ultimately influenced by the Chinese. The Chinese have been paying Leonardo—and, by extension, their suppliers—for U.S. intellectual property. The scheme was funded by the Chinese and agreed upon by Italy who, in turn, was likely guaranteed future business with China and its massive airline market. The nesting doll shell game looks like this:





Decade in Aerospace Infamy



Cyber Crimes—with Chinese Characteristics

Leonardo signed a preliminary agreement with COMAC in 2015.³⁶ China's initial cyberattack supposedly ended on May 7, 2015.³⁷ Another cyberattack at Leonardo's Pomigliano d'Arco facility began later that month on May 28, 2015.³⁸



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3	Count 1
4	7. Paragraphs 1 to 6 are re-alleged and incorporated as if set
5	forth in full herein.
6	8. From a date unknown, but no later than January 8, 2010, up to
7	and including May 7, 2015, within the Southern District of California,
8	and elsewhere, defendants ZHANG ZHANG-GUI, aka "leanov," aka "leaon,"
9	ZHA RONG, CHAI MENG, aka "Cobain," LIU CHUNLIANG, aka "sxpdlcl,"
10	"Fangshou," GAO HONG KUN, aka "mer4en7y," ZHUANG XIAOWEI, aka "jpxxav,"
11	MA ZHIQI, aka "Le Ma," GU GEN, aka "Sam Gu," and TIAN XI did knowingly
12	and intentionally conspire with each other and other persons known and
13	unknown to the grand jury to commit an offense against the United States,
14	that is, to:

 $Figure 16 - \underline{https://web.archive.org/web/20210414145144/https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chinese-intelligence-officers-and-their-recruited-hackers-and-insiders-conspired-steal}\\$

Sample	Compilation Time
Sample 1	2015-05-28 08:02:25
Sample 2	2015-07-14 12:33:39
Sample 3	2018-09-22 23:10:46

Figure 17 - https://web.archive.org/web/20210630190332/https://reaqta.com/2021/01/fujinama-analysis-leonardo-spa/

³⁸ https://web.archive.org/web/20210630190332/https://reagta.com/2021/01/fuijnama-analysis-leonardo-spa/



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 $[\]label{prop:company:$

³⁶ https://web.archive.org/web/20210706193036/https://www.leonardocompany.com/en/press-release-detail/-/detail/comac-cr929

³⁷ https://web.archive.org/web/20210414145144/https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chinese-intelligence-officers-and-their-recruited-hackers-and-insiders-conspired-steal

Collins Aerospace—American Company with Chinese Characteristics

Boeing designed the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) software. The MCAS software would lead to the 737 MAX crashes. However, the underlying lines of MCAS code were programmed by Rockwell Collins, who is proud to boast of their nearly 40-year partnership with communists in China.³⁹





Figure 18 - <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20210615150146/https://www.collinsaerospace.com/-/media/project/collinsaerospace-website/product-assets/global/asia/china/rc-china-30-years-infographic.pdf?rev=f64cc2d704cc446a81c23eb627fb7e6-to-linsaerospace-website/product-assets/global/asia/china/rc-china-30-years-infographic.pdf?rev=f64cc2d704cc446a81c23eb627fb7e6-to-linsaerospace-website/product-assets/global/asia/china/rc-china-30-years-infographic.pdf?rev=f64cc2d704cc446a81c23eb627fb7e6-to-linsaerospace-website/product-assets/global/asia/china/rc-china-30-years-infographic.pdf?rev=f64cc2d704cc446a81c23eb627fb7e6-to-linsaerospace-website/product-assets/global/asia/china/rc-china-30-years-infographic.pdf?rev=f64cc2d704cc446a81c23eb627fb7e6-to-linsaerospace-website/product-assets/global/asia/china/rc-china-30-years-infographic.pdf?rev=f64cc2d704cc446a81c23eb627fb7e6-to-linsaerospace-website/product-assets/global/asia/china/rc-china-30-years-infographic.pdf?rev=f64cc2d704cc446a81c23eb627fb7e6-to-linsaerospace-website/product-assets/global/asia/china/rc-china-30-years-infographic.pdf?rev=f64cc2d704cc446a81c23eb627fb7e6-to-linsaerospace-website/product-assets/global/asia/china/rc-china-30-years-infographic.pdf?rev=f64cc2d704cc446a81c23eb627fb7e6-to-linsaerospace-website/product-assets/global/asia/china/rc-china-30-years-infographic.pdf?rev=f64cc2d704cc446a81c23eb627fb7e6-to-linsaerospace-website/product-assets/global/asia/china/rc-china-30-years-infographic.pdf?rev=f64cc2d704cc446a81c23eb627fb7e6-to-linsaerospace-website/product-assets/global/asia/china-30-years-infographic.pdf?rev=f64cc2d704cc446a81c23eb627fb7e6-to-linsaerospace-website/product-assets/global/asia/china-30-years-infographic.pdf?rev=f64cc2d704cc446a81c23eb627fb7e6-to-linsaerospace-website/product-assets/global/asia/china-30-years-infographic.pdf?rev=f64cc2d704cc446a81c23eb627fb7e6-to-linsaerospace-website/product-assets/global/asia/china-30-years-infographic.pdf?rev=f64cc2d704cc446a81c23eb627fb7e6-to-linsaerospace-website/product-assets/global/as

³⁹ https://web.archive.org/web/20201107234223/https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/boeings-737-max-design-contains-fingerprints-of-hundreds-of-suppliers/2019/04/05/44f22024-57ab-11e9-8ef3-fbd41a2ce4d5_story.html



Sequence from Hell

The maiden commercial flight for the 737 MAX, with RC's parts and MCAS system, was on May 22, 2017.⁴⁰ A month after the first 737 MAX crash in October 2018, Chinese regulators approved UTC's acquisition of RC. Was China leveraging a compromised RC to approve a deal that was initiated well over a year prior to the crash?⁴¹ After Boeing's second crash, China was the very first country to pull the plug on the 737 MAX, creating a global domino effect. It seems as though Beijing helps create the crisis and then just so happens to be well positioned to benefit from the crisis. This is (economic) war by other means, as Clausewitz would describe.





General Lloyd J. Austin III (Ret.), former commander of U.S. CENTCOM, joined the board of United Technologies Corporation (UTC) in 2016. UTC then merged with the infamous Rockwell Collins (RC), which proudly partnered with CCP proxies for decades. This new UTC-RC behemoth would *then* go on to merge with Raytheon in April 2020.⁴² According to financial statements, Lloyd Austin received nearly \$1.4 million in compensation since joining the conglomerate in 2016. These nesting doll acquisitions could make Russians envious. Oh, and Austin was confirmed as the Secretary of Defense on January 22, 2021.⁴³

⁴³ https://web.archive.org/web/20210607094352/https://www.pogo.org/database/pentagon-revolving-door/people/llovd-i-austin/



⁴⁰ https://web.archive.org/web/20201130211355/https://www.malindoair.com/news-events/2017/05/22/MALINDO-AIR-TAKES-THE-SKIES-AS-THE-WORLD'S-FIRST-TO-FLY-BOEING-737-MAX-

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⁴¹ https://web.archive.org/web/20210122042419/https://www.courant.com/business/hc-biz-utc-rockwell-china-20181123-story.html

⁴² https://web.archive.org/web/20210629113620/https://www.thegazette.com/business/utc-raytheon-formally-join-forces-in-mega-merger-poised-to-reshape-global-aerospace-and-defense/

Questions and (no) Answers

Back to Italy...prior to the investigation, Leonardo terminated an employee for reporting anomalies surrounding Trans-Part Srl:

At the center of the investigator's focus is a supplier of Leonardo, Trans-Part Srl, a distribution company of materials and equipment destined for a diversity of sectors. Customers include companies in the military, aerospace, transport, and petrochemical [sectors]. The company based in Milan now has 4 people being investigated, both managers and employees. According to the investigation, in exchange for "rigged" orders they paid Leonardo employees gifts such as gift cards redeemable at gas stations and electronic stores. Compensation also came in the form of fictitious consultancy contracts: from 1,500 euros per month to as much as 30 thousand per year in commissions.

It doesn't end there. An honest employee, who dealt in safety at work, reported on the anomalies in Casoria and immediately was subjected to spurious disciplinary measures followed by an absurd dismissal. Frankly, it's maddening to think that at Leonardo you can fire an employee for reporting the truth.⁴⁴

What else is there to uncover about Arturo D'ELIA and Leonardo SpA?⁴⁵⁴⁶

I have my covers they can't do anything to me. - Arturo D'ELIA

After the first complaint by Leonardo in March 2017, the investigators were provided an absolutely reductive and misleading picture of the affair, wrote the judge.⁴⁷ Among other things, the original copy of the so-called "patient zero" disappeared—the first computer infected with the latest generation spy malware that was allegedly used by D'ELIA. According to the indictment, [Antonio] ROSSI deliberately kept silent about circumstances relevant to the investigation and for the immediate identification of D'ELIA.⁴⁸ In the information attached to the investigative documents, an interview is cited during which D'ELIA claimed that the same people related to the Leonardo affair could not do anything to him. Also, the D'ELIA added that he had left a written document with a notary.⁴⁹

⁴⁹ https://web.archive.org/web/20210108005240/https://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/2020/12/07/lhacker-ho-le-mie-coperture-non-possono-farmi-nullaNapoli05.html



⁴⁴ https://web.archive.org/web/20210301045827/https://www.ildesk.it/campania/gruppo-leonardo-nellocchio-del-ciclone-per-corruzione-e-gualche-licenziamento-anomalo/

⁴⁵ https://web.archive.org/web/20210111100218/http://www.stiletv.it/news/71702/eboli-cyberfurto-interrogatorio-di-garanzia-e-riesame-per-l-hacker-d-elia

⁴⁶ https://web.archive.org/web/20210224185255/https://www.startmag.it/mondo/leonardo-boeing-atr-hacker-usa-e-nato/

⁴⁷ https://web.archive.org/web/20210108005240/https://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/2020/12/07/lhacker-ho-le-mie-coperture-non-possono-farmi-nullaNapoli05.html

⁴⁸ https://web.archive.org/web/20210414165404/https://www.commissariatodips.it/notizie/articolo/attacco-hacker-a-leonardo-spa-due-arresti/index.html

Topline Connections

No excuse for Leonardo—with help from CrowdStrike—to have a cyberattack go undeterred at Pomigliano d'Arco for 5 years:

- CrowdStrike exposed China's cyber theft of U.S. intellectual property used to build COMAC's C919
- CrowdStrike was monitoring China and Russia's CR929 joint venture
- CrowdStrike partnered with Leonardo in July 2020 to improve Leonardo's "cybersecurity posture"
- Leonardo's built-in software protocols alerted police of an anomalous flow of data in 2017 from Pomigliano d'Arco
- The cyberattack was unsophisticated and the hacker made little effort to hide his tracks
- According to a federal judge, Leonardo initially misled responding authorities

China (and Italy) have everything to gain by strengthening COMAC and hurting Boeing:

- Injecting a competitor to Boeing in the commercial aviation market to drive down prices and secure future build orders with COMAC would help Italy (and Europe as a whole)
- Boeing parts/software manufactured by Rockwell Collins are directly linked to the two 737 MAX crashes, killing 346 people*
 - o These crashes sent the global aerospace industry into a tailspin even prior to impacts from the Chinese virus
- This sordid affair involves state-owned enterprises and "national champions" in aviation from around the globe
 - o COMAC, CRAIC, ATR, Boeing, Leonardo (and, by extension, Airbus)

The anomalies surrounding Arturo D'ELIA and Pomigliano d'Arco suggest further criminality:

- Arturo D'ELIA worked in Quantico, Virginia at the U.S. Air Force Office of Special Investigations (OSI), even claiming to have patched vulnerabilities in the Pentagon's network that he was previously arrested for exploiting
- D'ELIA has expressed to his girlfriend a desire for political asylum based on his sensitive work [in the Chieti/Pescara facility]
- The hack currently pinned on D'ELIA and ROSSI could still be ongoing, as investigators cannot locate the stolen data and if there were any entities/state actors that received the stolen data
 - o "I have my covers they can't do anything to me" and [he] "had left a written document with a notary"
- D'ELIA, who was surrounded by convicted felons while working at Leonardo (e.g., Alessandro PROFUMO), is the only one thus far to serve *any* time in jail, even though D'ELIA has not been convicted
- 10 Leonardo employees at Pomigliano were placed under investigation for money laundering through Google Payments only
 one month after D'ELIA was arrested
- Leonardo is a reflection of the Italian government, which owns 30% of the firm: corrupt, nepotistic, and (unjustifiably) proud



^{*}This report is dedicated to Samya Rose Stumo, who tragically died in the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302. Requiescat in pace, Samya.